Nikolai Petrov is a scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center.  Formerly, he served as chief organizer of the Analysis and Forecast Division in the Supreme Soviet (1991-1992) and advisor and analyst for the Russian Presidential Administration (1994-1995).

Question: How effective, in terms of leadership, have previous successors to Russian heads of state proven to be?

Petrov: To date there have not been elections in Russia that have truly decided who will be the next president. The principal difference between Medvedev following Putin and Putin following Yeltsin is that Putin truly was a successor, that is, a figure who was replacing the departing president. Medvedev is more of a protégé of Putin rather than his successor. This is not a situation in which Putin, even through non-democratic methods, has found a trusted successor to present to the nation as his replacement. He has instead produced Medvedev, and it is unclear how power and responsibilities will be split between them. It is obvious that the transfer of power, if one assumes that Medvedev will gradually receive greater and greater authority, will be a lengthy process, occurring over two, three or four years. In that period, the distribution of presidential responsibilities will be a highly dynamic and contentious affair. 

The problem arises not from Medvedev’s personal loyalty and connections to Putin, but from the fact that under the current system, which lacks precise definitions of who is responsible for what, constant conflicts between Putin’s circle and Medvedev’s circle are unavoidable. The fundamental question is to what extent the current system is capable of managing these conflicts and whether it can maintain stability while they are being resolved.

Question: If we turn to world history, would you say that the practice of a leader essentially handing over the reigns of power to another has proven to be a positive governing model, or are elections featuring candidates with competing agendas a better model?

Petrov: I think that appointing successors has generally been shown to be a negative practice. The question is not whether the leader that is leaving and choosing his replacement is good or bad.  Rather, without regularly occurring restructurings in government, the system becomes stagnant, less effective and exceedingly corrupt. This occurs not because of the personal failings of individuals assuming power as successors, but because this model implies keeping the system organized in such a way as to secure the interests of high-ranking officials, which is a very unfortunate situation.   

If, for instance, Medvedev were to come to power as the result of competitive elections, in which he declared what he intended to do and which policies, plans, and strategies he wished to realize, and assembled a new team of leaders, of course, that would be significantly better for Russia. However, it seems to me that Medvedev’s presidency, in all respects, will demonstrate the malignity of the model of appointing successors.

Putin came to power by a different method. An extremely unpopular president appointed his successor, assured the transfer of power into his hands, and subsequently a serious reconfiguration of power and replacement of key officials occurred. The current situation suggests that little will change and it is uncertain how the administration will function. Nonetheless, the inevitability of very serious conflicts arising is obvious. The manner in which the transfer of power is now being planned is dangerous for any political system; the process will lead to stagnation and the absence of governmental transparency and accountability.

Question: A well-known Russian joke says that every head of state leaves his successor a note: “If problems arise, blame it all on me.” Is it possible that Medvedev will re-evaluate the results of Putin’s presidency?

Petrov: If it was a true situation of Medvedev succeeding Putin, then that certainly would be the case. Putin, although he did not do so immediately, did, to a sufficient extent, critically analyze how power was organized and how it functioned under Yeltsin. Putin was also somewhat removed and not a close associate in that administration.

That could also occur in the case of a real transfer of power from Putin to Medvedev. However, the situation seems to be more akin to a change in a car’s tires, rather than a change in its driver.    

In that respect, Medvedev was very restricted during his campaign and will continue to be so in the future. If a real transfer of power occurs, then we will quickly learn about the true nature of the Putin period. It will not matter that Medvedev was an integral part of Putin’s command, that he was involved in a series of actions which, most likely, were not positive and effective.  He will still, as is common practice, when confronted with problems, attempt to explain away his difficulties by pointing to the situation he was given.

Medvedev is inheriting a troubled state of affairs. On the outside, everything appears wonderful: Putin recently reported on the results of his leadership, presenting them as a procession of endless successes. Responding to journalists, he said that he couldn’t remember one serious failure of his rule. It can be left on his conscience that he did not mention the Beslan tragedy, for instance. Yet fact remains fact. All the positive that could have been extracted from colossally favorable conditions not connected to Putin and his team has already been used up. Any president after Putin, and even Putin himself, if he were to remain in power, will face very serious problems. In that regard, the next president and Putin in his third term are not to be envied.

Question: It seemed inevitable that Medvedev would become Russia’s next president after he received Putin’s support. Why then, was so much trouble taken to exclude certain opposition candidates and leave only ceremonial figures in the running?  

Petrov: Let’s look at the last five presidential campaigns in Russia.  In 1991, when Russia was still a republic in the Soviet Union, the elections were truly competitive. In 1996, the runoff between Yeltsin and Zyuganov was very tense, even though one can take issue with the way that campaign was run.

Since then, we haven’t had an actual competitive election.  In 2000 we had the same federal figures and Putin was the incumbent prime minister and acting president whose approval rating jumped significantly in the several months he was in power.  In 2004, no show was even necessary; Putin’s only opposition was comprised of unknown and uninteresting characters.  What do we see today? We have two permanent opponents of the “Kremlin candidate” – the communist leader, Gennady Zyuganov, and the leader of the liberal democrats, Vladimir Zhirinovsky.  These figures are completely integrated into the system.  They are vying for votes without interfering with the authorities’ efforts to push through their candidate. 

There is also a “strategic candidate.” In the last election, it was Mironov, and this time it’s Bogdanov.  He is there to ensure that the elections take place and also, more importantly, to make sure that the other two candidates, no matter how loyal they may be, are not able to exact too much from the Kremlin.  If it weren’t for Bogdanov, Zyuganov could have demanded real presidential debates and threatened to rescind his candidacy, which would have made the elections completely pointless, or even impossible, if Zhirinovsky were to also drop out of the race.  Therefore, Bogdanov’s candidacy is essential. 

In this sense, everything is happening for a reason, although I think this could be a trap for the Kremlin.  Since there are so few candidates, Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky could earn a significant share of votes, more than their parties did in the elections for the Duma.  This would not be to the Kremlin’s advantage.  On the other hand, Medvedev getting a higher percentage of votes than Putin in 2004 would also look bad for the Kremlin.  If the percentages stayed the same, with Medvedev receiving 70 percent and the two opposition candidates splitting the remaining 30 percent, that would be too high for each of them for the Kremlin’s tastes.  The Communists have already complained about being robbed of votes in the Duma elections. Now, if their leader were to receive 15 percent of the popular vote, his arguments would be amplified. The same is true for Zhirinovsky.  He’s increased his political weight through all of this, and therefore, the costs for the Kremlin in dealing with him in the future have also gone up.

This is the problem with the current regime and with managed democracy in general: solving certain strategic problems successfully, as the Kremlin sees it, could end up costing them in the end.  After all, elections serve to legitimize the government in power.  The less free and more authoritarian the elections are, the less legitimacy the winner will ultimately have.  Elections also have a series of other functions.  They serve to strengthen political competition; they are the means by which the authorities can gauge the effectiveness of their strategic and policy directions; and they serve as the bridge between government and society.  When elections are turned into a parody, not only society suffers but the government does as well.

It’s easier for the Kremlin to do what it is doing now, but very shortly following the elections, they will begin to feel the negative consequences of their decisions.  If we look at Kasyanov, for example, it’s clear he couldn’t pose any significant threat as an opposition candidate.  However, the Kremlin’s desire to avoid any negative surprises by eliminating all variables has led to him being completely excluded from the race.