Parag Khanna is the director of the Global Governance Initiative and a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation. He is author of “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order."

Washington Profile: In your book, you give a new definition for the term “Second World.” What is the characterization that you give, and what is the Second World’s strategic significance?

Khanna: It’s two things.  There is a strategic understanding of the Second World, as there was during the Cold War, when it referred to the ideologically socialist Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Now, there is a non-ideology or anti-ideological mentality across the Second World countries spread across not just Eurasia, but around the world. That is one of the strategic characteristics of this new Second World: a desire to play all sides to gain position in the geopolitical marketplace, to forge relations for self-benefit with the major powers such as the United States, China and the European Union. But there is also a socio-economic dimension to the term. For most people today, the term “Second World” no longer has any resonance because it has fallen out of use in the last 15 to 20 years. We still say “First World” and “Third World,” referring socioeconomically to developed versus underdeveloped countries, but what about those in between? I thought the term would also be useful to describe not just countries which are halfway between the First World and the Third World, but those that have both characteristics at the same time, having so-called “mixed” developed and underdeveloped zones within their own borders. One finds an exacerbation of winners and losers and the rich-poor gap in a lot of countries, and those are the same ones that also have this strategic characterization of being anti-imperial. The term to me has two meanings and two connotations.

Washington Profile: You argue that in the world today, there are three “empires” that are vying for influence.   You don’t consider Russia to be among them?

Khanna: It’s not a superpower. The three superpowers are the EU, U.S. and China. Russia is a major power alongside India and Japan. But a superpower by definition has global influence and global ambition.  It affects decisions all over the world. Russia no longer aspires to actually do that. It has certain regional concerns and is very influential in a variety of ways, both in Eastern Europe, Europe and in the Far East, but that is not the world, so I don’t include it as an imperial superpower the way I treat China, Europe and America.

Washington Profile: You have argued that the United States is losing in the Second World with respect to Europe and China. Can you talk about why that is the case?

Khanna: Relative decline is an absolute fact.  It’s just a statistical reality, but I think we can all move beyond that. The book explains how the United States is pursuing its strategies in those Second World countries versus how China and Europe are doing it. I purposefully put them on a relatively even playing field, showing country by country how America is competing and not, as many would assume, winning in many of those countries.

Washington Profile: Central Asia is a strategically important area that you touch on in your book.   It is pursued for its oil and gas reserves, and the three powers are vying for influence there. Can you talk about how that struggle is going?

Khanna: One would have to say that the early and inherent advantage now belongs to China. Of course, there is a lot of legacy control that Russia exercises through its economic position and its historical connection with the leaders of many of the post-Soviet republics, most of whom, like Nazarbayev, are former Soviet apparatchiks. There are economic relationships between Russia and the diasporas in these countries and, of course, the infrastructure is still flowing north. There are a lot of legacy advantages that Russia has, but these are fading. Meanwhile, there has been an influx of Chinese into [Central Asia] and there is the Chinese economic role in the region with huge exports there. There is also new pipeline construction and ways that many countries, such as the “Stans” and particularly Kazakhstan, seek to push their resources in all directions. China has opened two pipelines already from Kazakhstan. Then there is the diplomatic role, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and China’s leadership in everything from border control to counterterrorism. There are a wide variety of areas in which the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has become a major regional entity for Central Asia. In political geography, there has been a real seismic shift. Russia only borders one “Stan”, whereas China borders three including Afghanistan and Pakistan. It’s a very different psychological view of Central Asia now that it’s no longer a Soviet zone.

Washington Profile: You say that Russia is the Second World’s ultimate swing state. What do you mean by that?

Khanna: Russia is still the largest country in the world. In terms of geopolitics, “Who controls the heartland rules Eurasia and who rules Eurasia rules the world.” That phrase is a century old, so I’m not repeating it as if it’s a mantra for the 21st century. On the basis of Russia’s absolutely enormous natural resources and strategic position, as well as the trade routes and access that symbolize movement from east to west, it remains the main strategic prize. Now, I am not saying that it will itself be the dominant power. It is going to be dominated or subdued or integrated, which is a very controversial claim. But it’s one that’s supported by many people who look at Russia from the European point of view and many who study China’s relationship with Russia. No one actually talks about Russia dominating China in any way, shape or form, although many people, including myself, have written about seeing the exact opposite potential for the next 50 to 60 years. The same thing goes for Russia’s relations with the EU, although some people speak about high gas prices and Gazprom’s ability to manipulate in Eastern Europe. No one could rightfully, looking at Russia’s economy, not point to its enormous dependence on European investment and Europe as its main export market, or the fact that its economy is about the same size as that of France. So it is in fact economically absorbable in some kind of partnership with Europe. It is just a question of the diplomatic path that it takes and how long it takes, but no one is claiming that Russia stands to be an actual rival to Europe or China in terms of its aggregate economic or political capabilities. Therefore, it is not the subject or the object, it is the prize.

Washington Profile:  What about the other former Soviet states?

Khanna: Well, the two that I give the most attention to are Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Ukraine I talk about as part of an ongoing tug of war between, at least temporarily, a resurgent Russia and the process of Europeanization. I claim in my book that I have no doubt, just based on Ukrainian demographics and the structure of its economy in terms of trade and investment, that it will gradually be incorporated into the enlarging European zone. To me, formal membership is not as important as the deepening demographic, visa and other kinds of economic ties that it increasingly establishes with both the EU and NATO. So I view Ukraine’s path as a slow and steady one toward more integration; plus Europe needs Ukrainian labor. The other one is Kazakhstan, which is basically the only success story in Central Asia. Of course success is relative, but by most measures, Kazakhstan has done better than most people expected. So I give it a lot of credit in my book, despite whatever flaws it has in its political system.

Washington Profile: Can you talk about the different strategies that the “Big Three” employ in the Second World and why you believe that the European approach is more successful than the American? 

Khanna:  There are certain inherent advantages to Europe’s geographical location. It has been a challenging task to enlarge and incorporate the European Union peacefully, and Europe has succeeded in doing that.   As I point out in the book, almost one country a year since the fall of the Soviet Union, which is no small feat. Of course you can’t compare that with America in that America doesn’t border 18 countries to the east, but Europe offers a multidimensional set of incentives in its package: not just EU membership but also economic subsidies, as well as trade advantages and common currency. Political-legal regulatory reforms bring modernization of the economy with huge amounts of foreign investment coming in once a country has an association agreement and beyond with the EU. I do very strongly praise the successes they have so far, but, as I point out in every other chapter, what does Europe do with countries where membership is not a viable option for geographic or cultural or developmental reasons?  It does not in fact have [a strategy], but then again America clearly doesn’t have a strategy toward Latin America, the Middle East or China, either. But [Europe] is developing doctrinal strategies towards China, India, the Middle East, Africa and beyond.

Washington Profile: And how does China’s way of operating in the Second World differ from that of Europe’s?

Khanna: I think the interesting thing about China’s approach is that it represents a kind of middle way where economic growth takes precedence over economic reform, rather than vice versa, which would be the Western way.  If you look at Africa, then China is right. That is not a good example of political reform taking place prior to economic growth.  China says, probably quietly, to its American counterparts who criticize it for not setting democratization goals: “Look at us and look at the success stories in Asia. We had economic growth before political reform.   You are actually condemning Africa by not focusing on their economies.” The only success story that Bush has actually had with Africa has been the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which was purely economic. All it did was allow a massive boost of African goods to the United States, which has really been helpful for African economies. It did not involve political reform at all. I am not anti-democracy, but I am pointing to the statistical reality worldwide that the economic side has to take priority.  So this is the case [China] makes in its diplomatic relations across the Second World and the Third World, and very successfully. They have compartmentalized what Europe does, but that is their style, and of course they table or simply ignore certain issues such as human rights.

Washington Profile: What would a truly multipolar world, which you say we are heading toward, mean for the United States?

Khanna: We would obviously be just one pole of power. We would have diminished leverage in every region, because there would always be a European, Chinese, Russian, Indian or Japanese option of forging alliances and partnerships to get ahead that doesn’t necessarily require the approval of the United States. Again, one can already see that happening. One can see Iran surviving on the Chinese and Russian lifeline, and situations in Uzbekistan with Russia and China backing the regime against the United States and so on. You already have a picture where there are multiple pillars of support for Second World countries. One can help them get by without a role for the United States in their affairs. The Middle East, for example, is increasingly able to fund its own development and growth, given high oil prices. Most of its energy exports are going to Asia and Europe and not to the United States, so why should the Middle East be dependent on the U.S.?

Washington Profile:  What can we expect to be the biggest global security threats in the next few decades?

Khanna: One has to worry about nuclear proliferation because the government in Russia clearly does not subscribe to the same proliferation norms, or has not, to date, as Western countries do, and that’s problematic. One has to worry about conventional weapons proliferation. It is not just because of China and Russia, but, in general.  As Second World economies grow, countries like India and Israel will expand their manufacturing of weapons. Their export industries are going to be less controversial and headline grabbing than nuclear proliferation, but I’m sure you’d agree that they are equally significant in the long run in terms of potential for causing arms races in various regions. I would say those are two major concerns. I don’t place terrorism as a global threat because when we use that term, we assume there is a global solution. I don’t think 15 U.N. resolutions defining terrorism, or the desire to create some kind of global fund or coordinating mechanism is the right solution for dealing with that transnational problem. It requires intergovernmental and other multiparty solutions or localized solutions that don’t include the term “global,” which is an abstraction that is used to get away from taking on or accepting certain localized responsibilities. I’m not against the term “global security.” I just don’t believe that it is helpful to call terrorism a “global threat.” So I would say the main issues that one has to worry about are how tensions over resources will play out amongst rising powers in the Second World and some of the new regional powers and superpowers. Energy security is also very high on the list.

Washington Profile: What do you foresee happening in the former Soviet Union over that same time period?

Khanna: The original Second World: what’s it going to look like? It’s a fantastic question. For me, it has ceased to have any coherence of its own, and therefore I wouldn’t give you one answer for the former Soviet Union as if that were still the Second World’s defining principle. Many of the western former Soviet republics are already European Union members, so why would one speak of them with regard to the prior designation as Soviet republics? The way I see it, [the countries of] Eastern Europe are increasingly gravitating out right up to the Russian border and will probably be members of the European Union, integrated with its currency, passports and the like. The same will probably be true of the Balkans, the south Balkans and perhaps the Caucasus as well. It could be the final frontier of the EU and certainly NATO. But they will definitely be more integrated with the West than with Russia. I see the “Stans” increasingly coming into the Chinese sphere of influence and potentially the American through Afghanistan and Pakistan. It clearly hinges on the success of NATO in South Asia, which is not part of your question, but is a huge variable. Most certainly, I see China increasingly dictating affairs and setting the terms in Central Asia.

Washington Profile:  And Russia itself?

Khanna: Russia is such a big country that I have to break it into four parts. I am not sure Russia has one future as such. I believe that what is happening with globalization, as I say in the book, is that while countries were once conquered, now are bought. I see China continuing its leasing of the Russian Far East for its resources, and Russia exercising ever less legal control over the area. Even as Russia’s population is increasingly [becoming ] diverse with local migration and so forth, the leadership will probably inevitably see itself as having a European future. So I imagine there will be a more global kind of relationship with the EU than there is now.