Steven Pifer is a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies Russia and Eurasia Program.  Formerly, he served as ambassador to Ukraine (1998–2000) and special assistant to the president and National Security Council senior director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.  

Washington Profile: The last decade has seen a new wave of revolutionary movements in various former Soviet Union countries.  Can you talk about the particularities of the Ukrainian case? What, if anything, made the Orange Revolution unique?

Pifer: The Orange Revolution was certainly extraordinary, in that so many Ukrainians acted to make clear that they would not accept a fraudulent election result following the November 21, 2004 run-off.  The ultimately successful effort by Ukrainians to protect their democratic rights captured the imagination of people around the world.  Particularly impressive were the large numbers of demonstrators and their apparent readiness to remain in the streets, despite freezing temperatures, for as long as it took to secure a just result.

Previous Ukrainian protests – such as the anti-Kuchma demonstrations in 2001 – had been much smaller in size and generally wound down after a few days, so few people predicted the scale of the Orange Revolution.  It certainly caught foreign observers – in Washington, Moscow and Europe – by surprise.  And a senior Our Ukraine official told me in January 2005 that the Yushchenko camp was also surprised; they expected some protests in the event of vote fraud, but nothing like the numbers that turned out.

Washington Profile: There is a strong feeling in Russia and elsewhere that the Orange Revolution and other revolutions in the former Soviet Union countries were mainly planed, supported and regulated by Washington and Brussels. What would be your comment? What roles did the U.S. and the EU play in the case of the Orange Revolution?

Pifer: Those who say Washington and Brussels planned the Orange Revolution considerably overestimate the capabilities of the U.S. government and the European Union, and they grossly misunderstand what happened in Ukraine at the end of 2004. 

The U.S. government did provide technical assistance targeted at the elections.  We planned this when I was still at the State Department.  Ambassador Herbst in Kyiv, Ambassador Pascual (who was then the assistance coordinator) and I insisted that the election aid be non-partisan, e.g., training programs for election commissioners and for the press on covering elections, funding for election observers, and similar programs.  The U.S. government earlier funded programs on party development, which were open to any party that wished to take advantage of the training.

But the U.S. government took care to avoid having its assistance programs favor one side.  First, that would not have been appropriate.  Second, we doubted that a U.S. endorsement would help a candidate; it would likely have produced a backlash.

After the badly flawed November 21 run-off results were reported and the OSCE election observation mission issued its preliminary assessment on November 22, both the U.S. government and the European Union publicly expressed concern that the reported results did not reflect the will of the Ukrainian electorate.  European mediators helped the Ukrainians to find a solution to the crisis in a series of roundtables conducted between November 26 and December 6.  But the Orange Revolution was primarily a Ukrainian phenomenon – launched by Ukrainians and, in the end, resolved on the basis of negotiations among Ukrainians.

Washington Profile: Do you think it’s possible for Ukraine to carry out balanced politics, maintaining positive relations with Russia while becoming a part Europe?

Pifer: The Orange Revolution caught the Kremlin completely off guard and prompted worries that a similar popular revolution could happen in Russia (though the situations in Ukraine and Russia differ greatly).  One result was the Kremlin’s decision to support the Nashi youth organization, as a pro-government movement that might counter any popular protest.

As for the broader question, Ukraine should be able to pursue a course of integration with the European community while maintaining stable and constructive relations with Russia.  The two goals are not and should not be seen as mutually exclusive.  And it does appear that there is a growing consensus within Ukraine on the desirability of drawing closer to and ultimately joining the European Union.

But there appear to be some in the foreign and security policy elite in Moscow who regard Ukraine’s geo-political orientation in zero-sum terms, i.e., they see Ukraine’s drawing closer to Europe as somehow a loss for Russian interests.  If that thinking prevails in the Kremlin, it will complicate Ukraine’s foreign policy.

Washington Profile: There are those who believe that Ukraine is not a legitimate member of the transatlantic community.  Considering that it also still has some ongoing tensions with Russia, would you evaluate the Orange Revolution as a success story?

Pifer: I disagree with those who think that Ukraine is not a legitimate member of the transatlantic community.  The country is embracing transatlantic values.  With the Orange Revolution and three successive national votes that met international election standards, Ukraine has shown that it is firmly on the democratic path.  With six straight years of rapidly growing gross domestic product, Ukraine also appears to have turned the corner on economic reform.

The Orange Revolution was a success – it triggered a fundamental break with Ukraine’s previous politics.  The super-presidency model of government of the Kuchma years has been replaced by a system in which there are greater checks and balances between different branches of the government.  Moreover, Ukraine’s citizens now know that they have and can exercise real power.  These are not small achievements.  The fact that opportunities for more radical reform in 2005 and 2006 were missed should not diminish the importance of the Orange Revolution. 

Washington Profile: If current processes continue, what will the situation in Ukraine look like in another 10-15 years?

Pifer: Based on its current trajectory, Ukraine has every opportunity to develop as a modern European democracy with a strong market economy over the next 10-15 years.  That does not mean there will not be bumps or setbacks on Ukraine’s path; there most certainly will.  But in 2020 I suspect that Ukraine will look much more “Central European” than “former Soviet.”