Washington Profile: How would you evaluate the political development of post-Rose revolution Georgia? What have been the successes and failures of the Saakashvili administration?

Lincoln Mitchell, Arnold A. Saltzman Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics at Columbia University: There have been concrete successes.  Getting Abashidze out of Achara clearly is an obvious one, but less dramatic ones also.  The government’s fight against corruption in Georgia has been positive: The country is less corrupt on a day-to-day level and also on a bigger picture level. Also, the policies of reforms they passed through to streamline the bureaucracies; to make it easer to do business; and reforming the education system under the minister Lomaia have all been very positive. There is a tendency now in Georgia to be all the way on one side or all the way on the other. It’s not a black and white picture. Since 2003, the problem in Georgia has been that there’s been a willingness on the part of government to cut corners on the issue of democracy. A lot of that has been because they are trying to do the right thing.  But if you pass a good law and don’t do it in a democratic way, it begins to raise problems, and over time they began to do that more and more. Of course, the constitutional reform in 2004 both in substance and process weakens democratic institutions in Georgia. Then it is a constant unsuccessful struggle to establish an independent judiciary.

Very frequently, when somebody criticizes the government in Georgia they get attacked in the press very vehemently. So it’s a climate where things feel less free, where the independent media is not nearly what it was under Shevardnadze, and for a variety of reasons, still the society is weak. So, you have a strong government with a strong president and no real check on that. I think while things have clearly gotten better in Georgia, they have not gotten better at the pace that people might like. Because of the president’s rhetoric, the expectations are so high that it’s created a problem. That’s what gets it to November of 2007. 

Charles King, Ion Ratiu Professor of Romanian Studies, Professor of International Affairs, and Professor of Government at Georgetown University: The administration has certainly kept Georgia at the forefront of U.S. interests in Eurasia. By aligning Georgia closely with the U.S. in the war in Iraq, the Saakashvili administration has garnered a considerable amount of goodwill from Washington. However, much of that effort has meant that the administration has spent more time pleasing external clients than working on the institutionalization and deep democratization of Georgian domestic politics. The real locus of the state's legitimacy has increasingly become external to the state itself. Certainly, the administration delivered on some of its early promises--such as dealing with police corruption and paving major roads. But even then, the administration staked its success on appealing more to external patrons than to a domestic constituency.

Washington Profile: What would be your explanation of the recent events in Georgian politics?  Do you think Georgia is developing state-thinking and this is why Saakashvili agreed to concessions, or was it due to pressure from the international community, particularly the U.S., as speculated by many?

Mitchell: I don’t think Saakashvili conceded to anything. The demonstrators were not demanding snap presidential elections. They were demanding, among other things, moving the parliamentary elections up.  What Saakashvili did was change the nature of the debate, which was a very smart tactical move.  Misha’s going to win this election. He’ll win it fair and square, and I think he knows that. But now the question is what happens after the elections. Is there ever going to be and independent media there? Are we going to have a president who is more open to look at a more democratic process for passing laws? As for the events themselves -- I find it baffling why he decided to send his troops. He knew right away what a terrible mistake he made. He lost a lot of popular support. I don’t think that was a devastating mistake but it was a big mistake. One that shows some of the problems of Georgian democracy.

King: The intervention of the U.S. certainly helped to push the administration onto its current course, but Georgian officials bristle at the idea that it was "American pressure" that sealed the deal. In the end, Saakashvili and his government were seeking a way out of the crisis that would accomplish two things: demonstrate the effective division and weakness of the opposition and secure a longer period in office for Saakashvili and his supporters. The current course seems to be leading to both these outcomes--but that does little to accomplish the overall democratization and institutionalization of Georgian politics which were hoped for after 2003.

Washington Profile: What kind of an impact could the recent Georgian developments have on wider political processes in Georgia and on the South Caucasus region, bearing in mind the upcoming elections in both Armenia and Azerbaijan?

Mitchell: It could be very big, or it could be a blip.  I suspect it will be somewhere in between. In terms of the broader region, the big winner in Georgia is Putin. This is, unfortunately, exactly what critics of the color revolution and critics of democracy point at.   They say, this is the democracy you want? This is a guy who is so well liked in the West and this is what he does to his people? That’s really very bad for democracy, very bad for Georgia and very good for the people who wouldn’t support that.  In a general sense, this helps the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. I don’t think you are going to see a period of instability in Georgia.  You’ll see a reconsolidation, and the question in my mind is will you see what would be the reconsolidation of the democratic regime or will Saakashvili moves decisively away from democracy after the next election.

King: Once again, the south Caucasus states continue to demonstrate that they have not yet institutionalized either fully democratic governance or state consolidation. That is, no south Caucasus state has yet to have elections that are boringly uneventful, nor have they had a change in the head of state accomplished through fully democratic (and, again, boringly uneventful) processes. The next test will be Armenia, but there again the state seems to be following a pattern already well tested in Russia, that is, effectively a managed succession.

Washington Profile: How do you see the situation in Georgia evolving in the near future?

Mitchell: The problem that Saakashvili confronts is that he doesn’t want to wake up on January 21, 2009 and be known as George Bush’s favorite semi-democratic leader. He’s connected himself so closely, not with the Americans, but with Bush in a partisan way.  A democratic Georgia is very valuable to the United States, because it shows that democracy can still happen in parts of the world where we didn’t think it could happen. A non-democratic Georgia is just another country.  For Georgia to remain important to the U.S. and to continue getting the support that it does under the new administration, it needs to visibly redouble it’s commitment to democracy. 

I believe that Misha wants Georgia to go on the right direction, but ultimately he’s having trouble figuring out exactly how to do it.  Most Georgians tend to think he is handling it correctly, and we have to recognize that, but it’s not easy and we can’t assume that he’s going to have real successes there for a while.  Similarly with the economy, he’s trying to do the right things, but it is a very difficult question. He’s had some successes, but not as many as he would like. Nobody wants to invest in manufacture or in tourism in a poorly run semi-authoritarian regime, so he can’t let the country move in that direction.  

King: Faced with a divided domestic opposition, Saakashvili will likely emerge victorious but with a less resounding victory than in 2004. Over the coming years, one is likely to see the "Rustaveli factor" continue to dominate Georgian domestic politics, as opposition groups put pressure on the government via the street rather than via Georgia's under-institutionalized politics.